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Many of our daily activities are achieved through goal-oriented routines which 
illustrates the adaptability and efficiency of information processing. Nevertheless, slips 
of action do occur. This study was designed to determine if slips of action can be 
induced in a well learned task and if so, how these slips affect specific indicators of task 
performance. Thirty (12 male) right-handed undergraduate participants were taught, 
with arrow cues, a sequence of dominant hand movements.  Following this learning 
phase, a portion of the sequences were altered by either changing the spatial location of 
the arrow cue or by changing the actual movement goal. Results revealed that 
participants made numerous action slips which were most prevalent when the 
movement goal was altered. This suggests that participants were unable to disengage 
their expected movement plan and thus were vulnerable to errors. In addition to 
exploring the frequency of action slips we also looked at participants’ reaction and 
movement times on trials that preceded and followed errors and found that a speed-
accuracy trade-off could not account for the slips. We also showed that frequency of 
slips on our task could reliably predict performance on the SART, a measure of 
inhibitory control, and the frequency of attention failures in daily living on the ARCES.  
Overall, the results of this study reveal that action slips can be induced by manipulating 
a well learned action routine and that the frequency of these induced slips reflects a 
participant’s tendency to commit action slips in everyday life. 
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In almost every hour of every day of our lives we are able to perform, with 
extreme ease, a number of activities that we once thought were virtually impossible.  
Consider for a moment your first time sitting in front of the steering wheel of a car.  
Quite possibly this moment was filled with excitement as it signaled your first foray 
into adulthood but chances are it was also accompanied by a sharp twinge of 
apprehension.  How will I coordinate myself to be able to manage all of the controls? 
Gas and brake with one foot, clutch with the other; one hand on the stick shift while 
also trying to keep the machine on the road?  At the time these tasks all seemed to 
require such a keen sense of attention and often mistakes were made as a result of pure 
inexperience.  Now however, with a few years or decades of exposure to driving a 
vehicle, it should be amazing to reflect on how seamlessly all of the required actions are 
coordinated.  Regardless of experience though, errors in the actions associated with 
operating a motor vehicle still occur.  Now, while the errors made by skilled drivers are 
much different and perhaps less frequent that those made by novices, unfortunately, the 
errors that experienced drivers commit are often just as life-altering, if not more so.   
Failing to check one’s blind spot when changing lanes or not noticing a new stop 
light at an intersection on one’s way home from work are dangerous yet common 
mistakes made everyday by many experienced drivers.  While it is easy to appreciate 
the costs that could arise as a result of these mistakes it is also important to recognize 
the costs associated with some of the less dangerous but still annoying everyday errors 
that we all make.  Meaning to turn left at an intersection to pick up some milk but 
instead turning right toward home like every other day is a common example of an 
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annoying everyday error that results in lost time and efficiency and unnecessary 
frustration.   
These everyday errors are certainly not unique to driving, instead, at one point 
or another they permeate almost every simple activity that we perform.  In fact, on 
almost a daily basis we catch ourselves saying “what was I thinking…?!” after making a 
silly error during the execution of a simple task.  Errors of this sort, or slips of action, 
are thought to indicate points in time when consciousness is either absent, disengaged or 
insufficient which allows automatic, unintended action sequences to be triggered 
inappropriately (Robertson, Manly, Andrade, Baddeley & Yiend, 1997).  Typically, we 
are prone to these unintended action sequences when we are in familiar situations 
performing well-learned and overly practiced tasks (Reason & Mycielska, 1982).  This 
type of environment makes very few demands on our conscious attention and as such, 
frees us up to think about or do a number of other things, leaving us vulnerable to 
distractions, boredom and slips (Broadbent, Cooper, FitzGerald & Parkes, 1982). 
Late in the nineteenth century William James wrote extensively about errors that 
humans make in everyday life.  He quite succinctly stated, “… habit diminishes the 
conscious attention with which our acts are performed” (James, 1890, pp. 114) and it is 
this and other statements made in his seminal writings that have caused many of his 
contemporaries to continue to pursue explanations about how and why these errors in 
everyday life take place.  Central to this inquiry however is also an investigation into 
what role attention plays in managing the occurrence of everyday errors and for that 
matter, at least a primitive description of what attention is in the first place is also 
required. 
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In his book, The Principles of Psychology (1890), James devoted an entire 
chapter to his study of attention and this chapter is now used as a Bible of sorts that 
researchers today still use to describe the intricacies of the construct.  While James’ 
contemporaries continue to debate and feud over what attention is and is not, no other 
researcher yet has more concisely nor more elegantly provided a broad definition of 
attention than James himself.  He wrote, “[attention]… is the taking possession of the 
mind in clear and vivid form, of one of what seems several simultaneously possible 
objects or trains of thought.  Focalization, or concentration, of consciousness are of its 
essence.  It implies withdrawal from some things in order to deal more effectively with 
others” (James, 1890, pp. 403-404).  In this one brief definition, James clearly 
communicates that attention is, necessarily, a limited commodity and as such, it must be 
selective in order to achieve its goals.  Inevitably then, while goal A is the object of 
one’s attention, all other goals will need to be put off unless one is so effective at 
executing the task that it requires minimal conscious attention.  Therefore, as James 
(1890, pp. 113) states, “… if practice did not make perfect, not habit economize the 
expense of energy … we would be in a sorry plight…”  However, it is this exact fact 
that makes humans vulnerable to everyday errors as “these mistakes are the price we 
pay for being able to carry out so many complex activities with only a small investment 
of conscious attention” (Reason & Mycielska, 1982, pp. 243). 
Actions Not as Planned 
 Considering the prevalence of errors in everyday functioning and the relevance 
of looking at failures of attention to provide insight into how attention operates, it might 
be surprising to find that little work has been done in this area.  One of the main 
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contributors to the line of inquiry however is James Reason.  Through a number of 
studies either conducted by or inspired by Reason, he categorized errors of everyday 
life, or slips of action, as being either the result of inadequate planning or the result of 
unintended problems during the execution of the plan (Reason, 1977, 1979, 1984 and 
Reason & Mycielska, 1982).  Everyday errors of the second type were termed ‘actions-
not-as-planned’ by Reason and he suggested that they were of interest not only because 
of their potentially life-threatening consequences but also because they provided insight 
into the construct of attention and even more broadly, the overall functioning of the 
mind.  Importantly, while these errors were not always the result of attention failures 
(perception and memory issues were also often implicated) his work on the subject has 
made large strides in bridging the gap between laboratory studies of attention and how 
attention actually functions in daily life. 
Reason’s Diary Studies. 
 In his writings, Reason makes clear that while measuring psychological 
constructs in real life situations is messy, for this topic of everyday errors, objective 
approaches are also riddled with difficulties.  While everyone at one point or another 
has experienced one of these errors, they still occur relatively infrequently.  In addition, 
as a result of the close relationship between reduced attention and error occurrence, the 
study of ‘actions-not-as-planned’ in a laboratory setting is highly susceptible to the 
artificial and intrusive methods of investigation.  As such, Reason and his colleagues 
used two main methods of collecting information about actions-not-as-planned, 
participant diaries and self-report questionnaires.   
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 In his first diary study, Reason had thirty-five volunteers keep a diary that 
detailed situations in which the actions that they performed differed from what they had 
intended.    In addition to recording the action intention and what was actually done, the 
participants were also asked to keep track of the date and time of the error as well as the 
circumstances surrounding the error.  This preliminary study resulted in a total of 433 
incidents where a participant’s action deviated from his/her intentions and it also caused 
Reason to wonder about other factors that may have been contributing to the errors.  
Consequently, he followed this first diary study with another, more elaborate, diary 
study in which sixty-three volunteers answered questions about the nature of their 
intended actions, the nature of their erroneous actions, their mental and physical states 
at the time of the errors and the prevailing environmental conditions when the errors 
were committed. 
 The results of these two studies revealed that slips were most frequent when 
executing activities that were highly practiced.  In addition, Reason also reported that 
many participants indicated that when errors were committed they were carrying out 
activities in a “largely automatic way” (Reason & Mycielska, 1982).  Interestingly, 
Reason also found large effects of time of day and the frequency of slips.  Specifically, 
he reported that errors were most highly associated with periods of maximal activity 
since slips were most frequent just before noon and between five and seven o’clock.   
Characterization of Errors.  In addition to investigating the impact of time of 
day on the frequency of errors, Reason was also interested in characterizing and 
categorizing the types of errors that participants made.  In the process of doing this, 
Reason found there were four main types of slips: actions that were repeating 
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unnecessarily (i.e., putting an ingredient into a recipe twice), actions directed towards 
inappropriate objects (i.e., trying to use a comb to brush one’s teeth), actions that are 
inappropriately incorporated into an action sequence (i.e., inappropriately putting 
vinegar in a recipe) and omitting required actions (i.e., neglecting to put cream into 
one’s coffee).  Importantly, with the exception of omission errors, Reason noted that all 
of the types of slips at least resembled normal actions that one could have performed 
quite acceptably under different circumstances.  For example, if one prefers coffee with 
cream and sugar, putting cream in a cup of coffee, would perfectly acceptable.  
However, when preparing a cup of coffee for a guest who drinks their coffee black, this 
action would be considered erroneous. 
Critical Decision Points. After closely analyzing the sections of the participant 
diaries that detailed the prevailing circumstances associated with the action slips, 
Reason also noted that the majority of reported slips occurred at points in an action 
sequence where a decision had to be made about how to proceed.  Reason postulated 
that these decision points are critical in predicting whether an error would be made.  
Specifically he suggested that it was at these junctures where participants had to access 
information about the goals of the action sequence and what actions had been done up 
to that point to achieve those goals (Reason, 1979).  For example, after adding cream to 
a cup of coffee one must consider whether one wants sugar in his/her coffee as well and 
if so, whether or not sugar has already been added.  If one does not ask himself/herself 
these questions, he is liable to either omit the sugar step or repeat it.  While Reason has 
suggested that everyday errors occur because of insufficient conscious attention and a 
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failure to actually check on task goals, others have theorized that errors are the result of 
a degraded online representation of the overall task (Botvinick & Bylsma, 2005).   
Like Reason’s diary studies Botvinick and Bylsma (2005) were interested in 
looking at slips of action in everyday tasks but they attempted to do this within a 
laboratory setting.  In their experiment they asked normal participants to make fifty 
cups of coffee and they intermittently interrupted the sequence of coffee making either 
in the middle of one of the actions (i.e. adding sugar) or toward the end of one of the 
actions.  Their results indicated that while Reason and his colleagues might expect more 
errors after an interruption toward the end of an action (nearer to a critical decision 
point) accurate coffee making was more affected by disruptions that occurred mid-task.  
Botvinick and Bylsma (2005) have explained these results by theorizing that context 
information about a task is represented actively online and as such is vulnerable to 
disruption at any point in the action sequence. 
Automaticity and A Model of Action. 
 Despite any disagreements in the literature about the specifics of action slip 
production, even Botvinick and Bylsma (2005) have conceded that checking and 
monitoring the progress of routine actions in everyday life is essential.  In addition, few 
would argue that slips of action are the penalties that we pay for automization as the 
likelihood of slips is strongly correlated with one’s experience with a task.  Within 
psychology today, the term automatic, as it relates to cognitive processes, is often used 
to describe situations in which one task can be performed with ease and without 
interfering with other simultaneous tasks as it does not require many attentional 
resources (Norman and Shallice, 2000).  Inherent in this working definition is the 
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implication that attention is of limited supply at any one time and as such, when the 
tasks at hand stretch it beyond its boundaries, impaired performance is likely to result. 
Despite the limitations of conscious attention humans are still able to perform, 
with very few errors, a number of actions simultaneously.  This feat, in and of itself, is 
evidence of the strength of human information processing but taking that ability for 
granted provides little information about how the phenomenon actually occurs.  
However, Shallice and Burgess (1993) and later Norman and Shallice (2000) have 
suggested a model of action that seeks to explain the attentional mechanisms through 
which actions are carried out, either automatically or with deliberate conscious control.  
Their theory postulates two control systems, each based on different underlying neural 
networks that work separately at times and together at other times to accomplish action 
goals.  One of the control systems, the supervisory attention system, works to allow for 
the conscious or controlled attention that is required when executing novel or dangerous 
tasks.  Norman and Shallice (2000) as well as Reason (1984) also suggest that this 
system is responsible for exerting inhibitory action over habitual responses when they 
are inappropriate.   
In order to allow for simultaneous action production, their model of action also 
includes a second system which they term, contention scheduling.  This specific system, 
whose responsibility is the control of well-learning actions, has been suggested to 
operate primarily outside of conscious control except at decision points where one must 
consider the overall action goals (Schwartz, 1995).  As a result, actions operated under 
the control of the contention scheduling system demand few cognitive resources.  But 
while this may make sense from an efficiency point of view, actions controlled by this 
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‘auto-pilot’ like system are also more vulnerable to errors as they are not monitored 
closely to ensure their accurate performance.  
Within the contention scheduling system, Norman and Shallice (2000) suggest 
that the errors that Reason (1977, 1979) characterized might occur for a number of 
reasons.  For example, intrusion errors (inappropriate actions being incorporated into an 
action sequence) could be due to environmental triggers that are not inhibited by 
supervisory attentional control.  Also, errors of omission (neglecting to include a 
necessary action into the sequence) could be the result of the insufficient activation of 
the routine action plan (schema).  Regardless however, all of these types of errors are 
suggested to result from a failure in switching from the ‘auto-pilot’ contention 
scheduling system to the more consciously controlled supervisory attention system at 
those critical decision points. 
Distractions and the Simon Effect. 
Neglecting to switch between these two systems to accomplish action goals has 
been shown by both Botvinick and Bylsma (2005) and Humphreys, Forde and Francis 
(2000) to happen more often and with more detrimental results when the routine action 
is interrupted and/or accompanied by a second task.  Others have shown that slips of 
action are more prevalent when external distracters are present in the environment 
(Buxbaum, Schwartz & Montgomery, 1998) while others still have suggested that 
internal factors like worry and boredom lead to increased action and attention slips 
(Manly, Lewis, Robertson, Watson & Datta, 2002).  Both of these situations however 
are perhaps also explained by the supervisory attention system’s resources being 
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deployed to attend to either the external or internal distracters instead of the central 
routine task. 
Whereas few researchers have attempted to study action errors under conditions 
of internal preoccupation, a number of studies have been conducted to examine the 
impact of environmental distracters on action production.  Much of the literature in this 
area is focused on patient populations (primarily victims of traumatic brain injury, 
patients with apraxia and Alzheimer’s as well as patients with dysexecutive syndrome) 
and there is overwhelming agreement that within these populations, errors on everyday 
tasks are significantly correlated with an increased presence of distracters (Buxbaum 
et.al., 1998, Robertson et.al. 1997, Schwartz, 1995).  Importantly too, while not 
investigated in the same patient populations, the physical location of environmental 
distracters may play a role in predicting the likelihood of upcoming action errors.  
Simon and Berbaum (1990) describes an effect named in his honour (the Simon effect) 
that shows that participants are quicker and more accurate when responding to targets 
whose physical location is compatible with the physical location of the stimulus/cue that 
instructed the movement.  This effect is referred to by others as stimulus-response 
compatibility (Weigand & Wascher, 2005) and insofar as it is considered to be 
facilitating when the stimulus and response are compatible, the opposite can be said 
when they are not.  Therefore, if one considers the potential impact of the Simon Effect 
on everyday action routines, one should be expected to prepare for tooth-brushing 
quickly and accurately if one’s toothbrush and toothpaste are within close physical 
proximity to each other.  However, errors might more likely result if one’s toothpaste is, 
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for some reason, located across the room or even worse still, if it is located near his/her 
comb. 
Sustaining Attention 
 As has been discussed previously, Norman and Shallice’s model of action 
(2000) describes two complementary systems which work together to control both 
routine and novel actions.  Involved in these two systems is an understanding that the 
contention scheduling system will operate independently and outside conscious control 
whenever possible to conserve attentional resources.  However, at critical checkpoints, 
the supervisory attention system may be required to intervene into the usual routine to 
accomplish slightly different action goals.  The effectiveness of this intervention 
appears however to be reliant on having sufficient sustained attention to the task at 
those critical decision points.  Such a seemingly simple process though is complicated 
by the fact that while new and exciting objects are able to draw our attention away 
involuntarily, focusing on routine tasks, even for a short period of time, demands a fair 
amount of effort and will.  Now, while focusing one’s attention on a tedious task is 
difficult for the most concerted individual, Robertson and colleagues (1997) have 
confirmed that patients with traumatic brain injury find the task even more challenging.  
They asked normal control participants as well as TBI patients to participate in a go-no-
go paradigm, the Sustained Attention to Response Task (SART), which involves 
responding with a key press to a series of digits (one through nine) except when that 
digit is three.  A task of this sort is extremely tedious but still requires each participant 
to actively attend to each digit as it appears or risk making an error.  As such, Robertson 
and his colleagues (1997) and later Manly, Robertson, Galloway and Hawkins (1999) 
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have asserted that one’s ability to avoid making errors on the SART reflects one’s 
ability to maintain consciously controlled, or sustained, attention.  On this task the 
researchers measured accuracy and response time and found that those with traumatic 
brain injuries made more errors than the healthy controls.  In addition, SART 
performance measures were also strongly correlated with responses on the Cognitive 
Failures Questionnaire (CFQ) which is a self-report questionnaire about the occurrence 
of cognitive failures in daily life (Broadbent, Cooper, FitzGerald & Parkes, 1982). 
The CFQ which has been shown to be correlated with objective measures of 
selective attention (Tipper & Baylis, 1987), and was once considered an excellent 
measure of individual proneness to errors (Martin & Jones, 1984), has more recently 
received harsh criticisms concerning its ability to predict attention-related cognitive 
errors (Cheyne, Carriere & Smilek, 2006).  In fact, some have suggested that the CFQ 
measures a number of underlying factors related to everyday errors, only one of which 
is related to attention.  In response to this, Cheyne and colleagues (2006) sought to 
develop another self-report questionnaire that more specifically looks at errors in 
everyday life that are attributable to disengaged or insufficient attention.  The Attention 
Related Cognitive Errors Scale (ARCES) was developed from relevant items on the 
CFQ, questions from Reason’s self-report questionnaires as well as the personal 
experiences of the creators.  The result was a very short, twelve item, questionnaire that 
asks respondents to rate how often certain slips of attention happen to them in daily life 
on a scale from one (never) to five (very often).  Quite happily for the authors of this 
questionnaire, they found that it was highly correlated with frequency of errors on the 
SART, which is thought to reflect lapses in attention (Cheyne et.al., 2006).  As such, 
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they have suggested that the ARCES reflects one’s propensity for making attention-
related errors in everyday functioning.   
It is important to recognize though that while there are definite advantages to 
asking for subjective reports of behavior, like with the ARCES or with Reason’s diary 
studies, these reports are at risk of being incomplete and sometimes even inaccurate.  
However, like mentioned earlier, devising objective means of investigating action slips 
is difficult at best since they rarely occur in a natural environment, let alone a contrived 
one.  Despite this though, developing effective methods of investigating action slips is 
important, primarily because of what they can tell us about the underlying mechanisms 
and processes that govern attention but also because of how they can help us to increase 
our awareness of what triggers slips, thereby helping us in minimizing their sometimes 
devastating consequences (Robertson, 2003).   
Inducing Slips of Action. 
 In an effort to develop one such method of examining action slips, members of 
my lab have designed a paradigm that fundamentally differs from those used by other 
researchers in the area because our procedure actually induces action slips rather than 
having to rely on rare, and potentially flawed, recollections of events.  The slip 
induction paradigm was devised to induce slips of action by requiring participants to 
deviate from a well-learned movement sequence.  As such, participants were first taught 
a sequence of seven hand movements to a series of four targets around a central home 
location.  Subsequent to having learned the sequence, endogenous (directional arrows) 
and/or exogenous (spatial location of arrows) cues are introduced that instruct 
participants to move to an unexpected location.   
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During the learning phase of the procedure, each of the movements within the 
sequence is indicated by an arrow cue that points to the location of the desired target 
button (up, down, left or right).  In addition, in this phase, the arrow cue is always 
spatially compatible with the target location.  As such, the cues contain both exogenous 
(the physical location of the arrow) and endogenous (the pointed direction of the arrow) 
information about the desired target.  Using this cue information, participants learn the 
sequence of movements by practicing it for between 120 and 720 trials after which 
participants should be able to expect and anticipate each move within the sequence.  As 
such, by the end of the learning phase of the study participants should represent the 
sequence not on a movement-by-movement basis but instead by the sequence of 
movements as a whole. 
Subsequent to the learning phase, to induce slips of action, participants once 
again execute the movement sequence a number of times but in this manipulation phase 
some of the sequences are altered.  These alterations can take one of three forms.  
Firstly, the goal of the movement may change by altering the pointed direction of the 
arrow cue.  For the second type of alteration while the goal of the movement remains 
the same, the physical location of the arrow cue is changed.  As such, when a 
participant expects an arrow cue to appear on the right that is pointed to the right target, 
the arrow now, while still pointed to the right target, is located either above, below or to 
the left of the central button.  Finally, the third type of alteration is a combination of the 
two previously discussed.  Consequently, this type of alteration includes both a change 
in the physical location of the arrow cue and a change in the actual movement goal.   
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 Parakh (2003) has shown that the exogenous and endogenous manipulations to 
the cue information used in this paradigm are sufficient to induce action slips, 
particularly when the spatial location of an arrow actually acts as an attractor toward the 
expected yet inappropriate target.  As such, they found that the first type of 
manipulation, where the goal of the movement is changed, but not the spatial location of 
the arrow, was most likely to create errors, or slips of action.  Importantly though, while 
this alteration type was most detrimental to accuracy, performance on trials containing 
either of the other two manipulation types also successfully resulted in significantly 
more errors than trials that were not altered in any way.  Therefore, Parakh (2003) 
surmised that the slip induction paradigm was an efficient way of inducing a number of 
action slips in a short period of time. 
 This particular study was designed to extend the work of Parakh (2003) by not 
only examining accuracy in more detail but also by looking at the micro-structure of 
sequence performance.  To accomplish this, a procedure very similar to Parakh’s (2003) 
was adopted but timing measures like reaction time, movement time and time to return 
to the home location were also incorporated.  Therefore, while a significant amount of 
this study is devoted to replicating the results found by Parakh (2003) we are also very 
interested in the specific timing dimensions that may or may not predict the occurrence 
of action slips. 
 Like in Parakh’s (2003) paradigm, participants in this study were assigned to 
one of three practice groups.  Those participants pseudo-randomly assigned to group 
one received one block of practice and therefore practiced the sequence of seven 
movements only 120 times.  In contrast, groups two and three practiced the sequence of 
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movements for three and six blocks of 120 trials, respectively.  The amount of practice 
received in the learning phase was manipulated to assess the potential differences that 
training may have incurred in the participants’ propensity to commit action slips.  If one 
is to believe what Norman and Shallice (2000) purport about the importance of 
switching from a contention scheduling system to a supervisory attention system to 
ensure accurate action production, then the degree to which the movement sequence 
was executed ‘automatically’ by participants should relate to his/her accuracy.   
Therefore, we expected that those participants who had received the most training had 
also learned the sequence more thoroughly and as such should execute the sequence 
more ‘automatically’.  As a result of this increase in automaticity we reasoned that 
participants who received more practice trials would only minimally involve the 
supervisory attention system to monitor performance and as such, they would be more 
vulnerable to errors when alterations were encountered.  Conversely, participants with 
less training trials may not have had enough time to adequately learn the sequence and 
therefore, may not have been as prone to error following the alterations.  
 Considering the fact that Parakh (2003) observed the most errors after 
alterations that manipulated a movement goal, we expected that this type of alteration 
would also be most detrimental to performance.  On the surface, making errors after this 
type of alteration is not surprising as participants are required to completely change 
their action plan.  A change of this sort inherently implicates the supervisory attention 
system as it is required to inhibit the expected or routine action plan and also create a 
new plan of action.  As we have seen though, the intervention of supervisory attention is 
not always dependable, especially when conscious attention is lacking (Norman & 
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Shallice, 2000).  Consequently, one might expect that a number of errors would be 
made in this alteration condition.  Importantly though, for this type of alteration, 
participants in the slip induction task might be even more prone to errors than was 
previously expected.  Since the arrow cue, whose exogenous and endogenous cue 
information was compatible, is now spatially located in a place that draws attention to 
the incorrect target, participants might be liable to not notice the actual directional 
information in the arrow cue.  As a result, participants’ moves to a target might be 
simply based on the spatial, exogenous information and therefore they will make an 
error.   
Another type of alteration that was used in this study involved incorporating 
external distracters into the environment.  This was done by keeping the goal of the 
movement the same as expected but by positioning the arrow cue in an unexpected 
spatial location.  This type of manipulation made it important for the participant to rely 
on the endogenous information in the arrow cue and to ignore the exogenous, 
distracting spatial information.  It was expected that this type of alteration would induce 
action slips because of the Simon Effect (Simon & Berbaum, 1990).  Simon reported 
that his participants took longer to respond to a target that was incompatible with its cue 
because they had to override their natural inclination to move toward the spatial 
location of the cue.  As such, even though it might not be part of the sequence routine, 
we expected that participants might naturally move to a target that is near the cue, even 
if the cue does not point to that target.  For example, even though the expectancy might 
be to move to the left target, if the arrow cue appears to the right, one might be likely to 
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move to the right target button even though the arrow was pointed to the expected, left 
target.   
Considering Norman and Shallice’s model of action (2000), slips occur if the 
supervisory attention system does not intervene with the contention scheduling system 
when the routine behaviors must change in some way.  As such, just before an alteration 
occurs, participants may be more prone to an error if they have gotten into a routine 
deeply enough that it is difficult to override.  Consequently, for behaviors that are 
overly routine it is efficient for the action production system to prepare for movements 
in advance, perhaps in the time when a participant is returning to the home location 
after the previous movement.  Therefore, to investigate this hypothesis, the time taken 
to return to the home button before an altered movement will be analyzed with 
reference to whether an error was made or not.  If in fact it is the case that movements 
are planned in advance of the actual arrow cue, during the time taken to return to the 
home button, this return to home time should be significantly longer than for all other 
trials. 
Regardless of the type of alteration that is present in this study, it is expected 
that participants will exhibit faster reaction times and movement times for trials in 
which an error is made than when participants are able to adjust their expected 
movement plan and therefore avoid an error.  Robertson and colleagues (1997) have 
demonstrated this finding with their SART task and since our slip induction task also 
requires an inhibition of expected response, it is safe to assume that those results should 
carry over into our paradigm.  What is still up for debate however, is the cause of this 
particular difference in reaction and movement times.  While it is entirely possible that 
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shorter reaction and movement times make a participant more prone to committing an 
error, it is also possible that when a correction to the expected plan is required, those 
times must be elongated to allow for changes to the plan.  If this is the case, in order to 
allow time for the supervisory attention system to intervene and for the preparation of a 
new action plan, sequences that are altered but are correctly executed should have a 
longer movement time, and possible a longer reaction time, depending on when in the 
timing structure the alteration occurs. 
In real life action production, the only way to guard against slips of action is to 
learn from them when they do occur.  In keeping with this, and the fact that participants 
were motivated to avoid errors, it is expected that participants would attempt to avoid 
action slips whenever possible.  Following an alteration that resulted in an error, it was 
hypothesized that participants would attempt to prevent subsequent errors by slowing 
down their movements and focusing more closely on the action sequence.   Conversely 
however, following an altered yet correctly executed trial, it was expected that 
participants’ timing measures would not differ from those associated with non-altered 
trials. 
In addition to looking at the specific timing breakdown of sequences that were 
altered another focus of this study is to investigate the relationship between our slip 
induction paradigm and other well-established measures of action and attention slips.  
Specifically, the SART and ARCES questionnaire were selected and it was expected 
that number of errors on the slip induction task would predict the number of errors on 
the SART and also the amount of self-reported action and attention slips in everyday 




Participants.   
 
Thirty University of Waterloo undergraduate students (12 male) volunteered to 
participate in this study.  All participants were right handed, had normal or corrected-to-
normal vision and gave their informed consent before taking part.  Twenty-five of the 
participants were recruited from Kinesiology 330, a University of Waterloo course on 
research design.  These students chose to sign up to participate in this experiment from 
a list of available studies that were being conducted on campus.  As part of their 
participation, after completing the requirements of the experiment they were given a 
synopsis of their individual data which they analyzed within a small group and used to 
write a brief research report for course credit.   
Experimental design. 
 The purpose of this study was to induce a number of slips of action in a short 
period of time by requiring participants to deviate from a well-learned movement 
sequence.  To accomplish this, participants were asked to learn a series of seven right 
hand movements to four target buttons located around a central home button.  For each 
movement in the sequence, an arrow appeared either above, below, to the right or to the 
left of the central button that pointed to the target.  As such, for each movement, 
participants received both exogenous, the physical location of the arrow on the screen, 
and endogenous, the pointed direction of the arrowhead, information about the target 
location.   
Depending on their subject number, participants practiced the sequence of 
movements for either one, three or six blocks of 120 training trials.  Subsequent to this 
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learning phase, participants were asked to again execute the sequence of movements; 
however, in this experimental phase, twenty-eight percent of the trials were altered by 
either changing the spatial location of the arrow cue, by changing the direction of the 
arrowhead and therefore the actual movement goal or by changing both of these 
components.  As such, three types of alterations to the learned movement sequence 
were introduced (see figure 1 in appecdix for pictorial representation of alteration 
types). 
Type 1:  Positional Alterations 
For this type of alteration the goal of the movement remained as expected 
however, the spatial position of the arrow cue was changed.  As such, for positional 
alterations, when participants expected to see an arrow located to the right indicating a 
movement to the right target, they actually saw an arrow pointed to the right but located 
either above, below or to the left of the central home button.  Therefore, the only cue 
information that was unexpected was the exogenous information which is 
communicated by the spatial positioning of the arrow cue.   
Type II: Directional Alterations 
Directional alterations were exactly the opposite of positional ones.  As such, 
while the spatial position of the arrow cue was as expected, the direction of the arrow 
head was changed and therefore the actual goal of the movement was changed from 
what was expected in practice.  This meant that when participants expected to see an 
arrow located to the right indicating a movement to the right target, they actually saw an 
arrow pointed up, down or to the left, but yet still located to the right of the central 
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home button.  Consequently, this type of alteration only manipulated the endogenous 
information that the participants received. 
Type III: Combined Alterations 
In this final type of alteration, both the endogenous and exogenous information 
that the participant received was changed.  Thus, both the spatial location of the arrow 
cue and the pointed direction of the arrowhead were randomly changed from what the 
participants expected.  As such, for combined alterations, even though participants may 
have expected an arrow to appear to the right and point to the right target, the arrow cue 
could have actually appeared in any one of the other spatial locations and was pointed 
to any one of the other targets.   
Stimuli and apparatus 
The sequence of arrow stimuli used in this experiment was created using Micro 
Experiments Laboratory (MEL 2.0).  Each of the arrow cues that were displayed using 
this program measured 20 mm in length, with 10 mm arrowhead fins, and they were 
displayed 125 mm from the center of the screen in one of the four directions.  The 
sequence of arrow stimuli were shown on a 15 inch flat-screen monitor that was 
inverted to allow the stimuli to be projected onto a mirror which occluded the 
participants’ hands (see Figure 1 for depiction of this setup).  Situated under the mirror 
was a 16 inch by 16 inch button board equipped with five 2 inch diameter buttons, one 
located centrally with the others located to the north, south, east and west of the central 
home button.  Participants made movements to and from these buttons and accordingly 
participants’ reaction times and movement times were recorded when these buttons 
were released and depressed.  Each participant was seated directly in front of the 
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apparatus at a distance where the tip of their fingers barely brushed the back of the 
apparatus and all five buttons were within easy reach.   
Procedure. 
 Upon arriving at the laboratory participants were informed of the general 
procedures of the study including the risks and benefits that they might incur.  This 
discussion included making sure they knew that the study would require them to come 
into the lab on two separate days and that the study would take in total up to 3 hours of 
their time.  After giving their informed consent, even-numbered participants completed 
the Sustained Attention to Response Task (SART) and the Attention Related Cognitive 
Errors Scale (ARCES) while odd-numbered participants skipped this step and 
proceeded directly to the training phase of the slip induction task (they would complete 
the SART and ARCES at the completion of the study). 
 For the training phase, participants were assigned to one of three practice groups 
depending on their subject number.  Regardless of the amount of training however, the 
participants received the same instructions and the learning phase always began by 
quickly getting acquainted with the button locations on the response board.  Once 
familiar with the response board participants were informed that a series of arrows were 
going to appear and their task was to move as quickly and as accurately as possible to 
the buttons on the response board that corresponded with those arrows.  During this 
training session, the position and direction of the arrow cues were never manipulated 
and the participants were informed that this was the case.   
 Five to eight days after the training phase, each participant returned to the 
laboratory for the experimental session.  This second phase of the study took 
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approximately the same amount of time for each participant as each were required to 
complete 5 blocks of experimental trials with 120 trials per block.  Out of these 600 
sequences 28% were altered.  Seventy of the trials had the directional alteration, forty-
two were altered positionally and another twenty-eight involved the combined 
alteration.  At the beginning of this experimental phase of the study participants were 
informed that a portion of the sequences would be changed in some way and that their 
task would be to follow the arrow’s instructions.  As such, if an arrow appeared that 
pointed to a new target, they were to move to that new target as quickly and as 
accurately as possible.  Before actually commencing the section of the study in which 
trials were altered, the participants were first given an opportunity to become 
reacquainted with the movement sequence on a series of 60 reminder trials which were 
not altered in any way before beginning the experimental blocks.  For the first few 
minutes of both the training and experimental phases an experimenter stayed with the 
participant to ensure that they had understood the instructions and they had an 
opportunity to ask questions while actually experiencing the protocol.   
Turning now to the sequence of events for each trial, a fixation cross appeared in 
the center of the screen at the beginning of each sequence of seven movements.  This 
fixation cross remained for between 500 ms and 1500 ms to ensure participants were 
not able to predict when the sequence of arrow cues was going to begin.  Once the 
fixation cross disappeared, the participant pressed the central home button, which 
automatically triggered the onset of the first arrow cue.  Upon seeing this arrow cue, the 
participants released the home button and quickly moved to the target that it pointed to.  
At the release of the home button the participant’s reaction time (RT) was recorded and 
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this also triggered the beginning of the movement time measure.  Once reaching the 
target, participants quickly pressed the button which signaled the end of movement time 
(MT).  They subsequently released the button and immediately returned to the central 
home button.  The time that elapsed between the release of the target button and the 
next depression of the home button was also recorded and this measure will herein be 
referred to as ‘return to home’ (RtH) time.  In addition to RT, MT and RtH time, the 
overall time that it took to complete each sequence (sequence time, ST) was also 
recorded as was the participants’ overall accuracy. 
Analyses. 
Establishing practice effects. 
To investigate the potential effects of the three amounts of practice, a number of 
analyses were conducted looking at the overall time to complete the movement 
sequence as well as the number of errors made.  Considering first the time to complete 
the sequence (ST), a one-way ANOVA, accompanied by the Tukey’s HSD post-hoc 
test, was computed using the STs from the participants’ last 120 trials of practice.  This 
test was followed by similar within-subjects ANOVA and Tukey’s HSD tests which 
examined the hypothesis that the amount of errors made would decrease with more 
blocks of training. 
Reminder Trials.  To determine whether any practice effects in the training 
phase were maintained into the second day of testing, STs and accuracy were also 
examined for the 60 reminder trials.  For these tests, using accuracy and ST as the 




 Number of errors made by each subject were tallied and grouped according to 
whether the error was on a directionally altered trial, a positionally altered trial, a trial 
with a combined alteration, or a trial that was not altered in any way.  These four error 
frequencies were then converted into percentage accuracy scores by dividing the 
number of errors made on each type of trial by the total number of possible errors that 
could have been made.  The resulting accuracy scores were tested against each other by 
using a one-way ANOVA and a follow-up Tukey’s HSD post-hoc test.  This was used 
to determine whether the alterations were successful at inducing slips and also to 
explore whether any certain alteration was more effective than the others. 
Examining the timing structure. 
 In light of the hypotheses about movements immediately proceeding and 
following alterations that were discussed earlier, a number of statistical tests were 
conducted.  Four groups of statistical tests resulted.  One group of tests looked at 
participants’ RT, MT and RtH for the trial immediately before an error was made.  A 
second group investigated these measures right before a correct, yet altered, trial was 
executed.  The third group of analyses explored the same measures for the trial 
immediately following an error and the fourth group looked at the measures after a 
correct, yet altered, trial was completed.  All of these ANOVAs used amount of practice 
as a between-subjects factor and the dependent measure of interest (RT, MT and RtH 




Considering congruence with other measures. 
 To determine the extent to which other accepted measures of inattention would 
predict performance on this slip induction task, a number of regression analyses were 
computed.  Firstly, the SART task features measures of hits (situations where a button 
press is withheld accurately), misses (situations where a button press is not withheld 
when it should have been) and false alarms (situations where a button press is withheld 
inappropriately).  In addition, participants’ subjective reports of experiencing attention 
failures in daily life were scored on the ARCES questionnaire.  Using a step-wise 
regression to eliminate the potential effect of practice group, each of these components, 
SART misses, SART false alarms and ARCES score were regressed upon the total 
number of errors, the number of errors made on altered trials and the number of errors 
made on unaltered trials.  Finally, to ensure that these results were interpretable in light 
of the literature available on these two measures, correlations were also conducted to 




While the means were in place to discard any individual sequences in which 
participants made more than three errors, those methods were not used as no one 
executed more than two errors in any one sequence in either the training or the 
experimental sessions. 
Impact of Training Group 
Before looking specifically at the ability of our paradigm to induce slips of 
action it is important to examine participant performance during the training session.  
As such, the results discussed in this section are grouped according to the amount of 
training that each participant received.  Shown below (in Table 1) are the average times 
to complete the entire sequence of seven movements for the final block of practice that 
participants received.   
Table 1:  Average sequence time (ST) in milliseconds for each training group in their  
               final block of training. 
 
Training Group Average ST (ms) 
1 training block 4250.34 
3 training blocks 2934.44 
6 training blocks 2916.79 
 
This data clearly suggest a trend that participants with increased training are able 
to execute the sequence more quickly than those with less training.  This trend was 
confirmed statistically through a between groups ANOVA which showed a main effect 
of training group on time to complete the sequence, F(2, 27) = 14.402, p < 0.001.  In 
addition, a Tukey’s HSD post hoc analysis of this main effect revealed that while 
participants with one block of training were significantly slower than those with three or 
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six blocks of training, those groups with more training (groups 3 and 6) were not 
significantly different from each other (see Figure 2). 
Figure 2: Average sequence time (ST) in milliseconds for each training group and for  
               each block of training. 
 
 Upon examining whether this effect of training group on ST was carried over 
into the reminder section of the experimental session a one-way t-test showed even after 
a delay of five to eight days, those with more training were still performing the 
sequence significantly faster than participants from group one who received only one 
block of training, t (28) = 2.085, p = 0.046 (see figure 3). 
Figure 3: Average sequence time (ST) in milliseconds for participants with one block of  
                training and participants with three and six block of training during the  
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Alterations and Slip Induction 
One of the main goals associated with this study was to determine whether the 
alterations introduced into the well learned sequence would be sufficiently confusing to 
induce slips of action.  Consequently, the results discussed in this section will address 
this question.  Upon examining accuracy in completing the sequence of movement, a 
main effect of alteration type is observed, F(1, 29) = 6.643, p = 0.015.  As such, our 
prediction that participant performance would dramatically decline upon the 
introduction of alterations of any type was confirmed.  In addition, post-hoc analyses 
with Tukey’s HSD revealed that each alteration type also significantly differed from 
each other.  Therefore, while accuracy was significantly worse in response to a 
combined alteration than a positional alteration, accuracy after a directional alteration 
was also significantly lower than for each of those types previously mentioned (see 
figure 4).  These results support previously reported data collected by Parakh (2003) 
and further establishes their claims that directional alterations are most detrimental to 
performance. 
Figure 4: Overall performance accuracy across alteration types. 
 
Interestingly however, while directional alterations were most likely to induce 


















was changed, were able to induce significantly more slips than when no alteration was 
present, t(29) = 4.199, p < 0.001.  This finding is most likely the result of the Simon 
Effect which posits that an incompatibility between a stimulus and response can lead to 
increased movement times as well as increased errors (Simon & Berbaum, 1990). 
Accuracy and Training 
 Considering the effects that were observed during the training and reminder 
sections of this study, we also predicted that participants with increased training would 
have learned more information about the sequence, perhaps would have performed the 
sequence more automatically than the other participants who received less training and 
therefore would commit more action slips.  This hypothesis however, was not supported 
by the data.  In fact, no significant differences were observed between the amount of 
training received and participants’ accuracy performing sequences with either alteration 
type (see Table 2).  Most likely, the strength of this relationship was diminished thanks 
to relatively few participants in each training group and these participants’ insufficient 
propensity to make errors within a limited set of 720 trials.  As a result of these factors, 
it is impossible to comment on the degree to which one’s training on a task interacts 
with one’s accuracy when performing it under altered conditions. 
Table 2: Percentage accuracy for each training group when executing sequences that  
              contained either positional alterations, directional alterations or combined  
              alterations. 
 
Training Group Positional Alteration Directional Alteration Combined Alteration 
1 training block 82.9 24.3 26.4 
3 training blocks 87.6 26.4 38.9 





The Timing Micro-Structure of Trials 
 The results discussed up until now have focused on either the time to complete 
an entire sequence or the overall accuracy in completing the slip induction task.  In this 
next section, the ST will be broken down into its micro-structure and as such the 
individual measures of reaction time, movement time and return to home time will be 
examined.  In addition, each of these timing measures will be discussed for not only the 
actual trial that was altered but also the trials that preceded and followed the alteration 
(summary below in Table 3).  Finally, for each situation where an alteration was 
present, the results are grouped according to whether an error was made or whether the 
sequence was executed correctly. 
Table 3: Average ST, RT, MT, and RtH times (in ms) for unaltered trials, altered trials 
and trials that preceded and followed an alteration. 
 





 No Alteration Error Correct Error Correct Error Correct 
ST 3179.30 3620.85 3937.94 3584.38 3925.73 3711.22 3960.16 
RT 118.79 112.28 126.32 116.75 119.95 140.55 129.11 
MT 184.83 193.59 465.17 171.54 191.3 316.08 314.05 
RtH 175.65 163.50 184.85 173.79 185.82 488.62 320.27 
 
Altered Trials. 
 As is evident in the above table, when considering the trials in which an 
alteration took place, there is a dramatic increase in the MTs associated with trials that 
were executed correctly as compared to trials that resulted in errors (see figure 5).  
While a trend toward increased RT and RtH times is seen for correctly executed trials, 




Figure 5: Average MTs (in ms) for altered trials that were executed correctly or  
                resulted in errors. 
 





Trials Preceding an Alteration. 
Now considering the trials that preceded an alteration it is evident that while a 
trend might be emerging that RT, MT and RtH times are shorter for trials immediately 
before an error (see figure 6), no statistically significant results were established.  
Therefore, while it is possible that reacting and moving more quickly reduces one’s 
likelihood of being able to correct one’s expected movement plan, this is not 
substantiated by the results of this study. 
Figure 6: Average RTs, MTs and RtH times for trials immediately preceding an  
               alteration which induced either an error or a correction to the expected  





























Trials Following an Alteration. 
With respect to the breakdown of the timing measures, looking at the trials 
immediately following an alteration can lend insight into whether participants noticed 
that they had committed an error and how they reacted to making those errors.  As is 
evident in Table 3 and below in Figure 7, participants’ average RTs and MTs appear 
considerably longer following an error than for trials that were not altered.  While this 
trend is not statistically significant for the reaction time data, it is strongly significant 
for the movement time data, t(29) = -12.883, p < 0.001. 
Figure 7: Average RTs and MTs (in ms) for trials that were not altered, trials that were  
                altered, and trials that immediately followed an alteration. 
 
 
 In addition to the effects discussed above with RTs and MTs, the RtH times for 
trials immediately following an error are also significantly longer than for those trials 
that were not altered, t(29) = -13.478, p < 0.001 (see Figure 8).  This might suggest 



















recognize that an error had been made until they were returning to the home button and 
as such, took extra time processing that slip.  Alternatively, after recognizing that an 
error had been made, participants took extra time returning to the home button to ‘reset’ 
the automatized sequence in an effort to prevent subsequent errors. 
Figure 8: Average RtH times (in ms) for trials in which no alteration was made, for  
                trials that followed an altered yet correctly executed trial and for trials that  




Relationship between the Slip Task and Other Measures of Attention Failures. 
 Another goal of this study was to examine how our slip induction paradigm is 
related to other widely used measures of attention failures, mainly, the Sustained 
Attention to Response Task (SART) and the Attention Related Cognitive Errors Scale 
(ARCES).  In previous studies, scores on the ARCES have been shown to positively 
correlate with the number of errors made on the SART.  As such, before examining the 
extent to which these measures are related to our paradigm, it made sense to first verify 
that a similar correlation was with the current population and this was indeed found but 
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 Upon confirming that the SART and ARCES were operating within this 
population as expected, a number of regressions were performed to examine the 
relationship of each of these measures with our slip induction task.  Regressions were 
done in a step-wise manner and the amount of training each participant received was 
included in the model.  When looking closely at the regression model in each of the 
following cases however, the step which included the training group did not 
significantly explain any more of the variance.  Therefore, one can conclude that there 
was no effect of training group on the ability of our slip induction task to predict SART 
errors or ARCES scores. 
Sustained Attention to Response Task. 
 The main measures associated with the SART task are total number of errors 
(misses), total number of false alarms and response time (in ms).  As such, each of these 
measures was examined in relation to the number of slips made on our task when either 
the trial was altered or was not altered in any way (no expectancies were violated).  As 
expected, the number of errors that participants made on altered trials did significantly 
predict the number of errors that they would make on the SART task, r = 0.549, p = 
0.002.  This finding however was not replicated when looking at the participants’ 
tendency to commit false alarms on the SART, r = 0.210, p = 0.266. 
Attention Related Cognitive Errors Scale 
 The ARCES questionnaire is a self-report scale of how often failures of attention 
happen in a participant’s daily life.  As such, a high score on this questionnaire reflects 
a participant’s feeling that attention failures occur relatively frequently whereas a low 
score indicates that attention failures are quite rare in their daily life.  Upon examining 
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the relationship between this measure and the number of slips made on our task (on 
either altered or unaltered trials), regression analyses revealed that it is only the number 
of errors made when a trial is not altered that predicts a participant’s ARCES score, r = 
488, p = 0.006.  Interestingly, while this effect is quite strong, when considering the 
number of slips participants made on altered trials, the ability to predict ARCES scores 
plummets, r = 0.162, p = 0.394.   
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Discussion 
 This study was intended to shed light on the precursors to and results of 
attentional failures by experimentally inducing slips of action.  This was achieved 
through manipulating a well learned action routine by requiring on-line adjustments to 
the expectations that participants had about upcoming movements.  Previous studies on 
this topic have been limited by a number of factors which includes but is not limited to 
a reliance on rare and perhaps inaccurately recalled events.  This particular study was 
designed to supplement previous work in the field by creating an experimental 
paradigm in which several slips could be induced in a brief period of time.  In addition, 
this study allowed for the collection of detailed behavioral and physical data which 
helps to enrich the pre-existing database of published studies.   
 As was discussed earlier in the introduction section of this paper, virtually every 
person has had some experience where they intend to do one thing yet find themselves 
doing something else.  Many have suggested that these slips of action are most likely in 
familiar environments (Manly et.al., 1999), while others have stressed the importance of 
distractions and drifts from conscious control (Broadbent et.al., 1982) in the generation 
of these errors.  Perhaps most notably, Norman and Shallice (2000) have proposed a 
model of action which highlights the role of the supervisory attention system as a 
moderator or overseer of the system which is most active when performing highly 
routine tasks.  This contention scheduling system, while extremely efficient, requires 
the intervention of the supervisory attention system in situations where the routine 
action at hand must be adjusted in some way because of a new goal or demand.  As 
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such, if the supervisory attention system fails to intervene at appropriate times, adequate 
adjustments to the routine action may be missed and a slip of action may occur. 
 For this present study, we were motivated to discover the conditions under 
which the supervisory attention system would fail to intervene.  Consequently, we 
devised a paradigm in which participants were trained on a simple movement sequence 
and we manipulated this sequence in one of three ways.  Firstly, positional alterations 
were designed to investigate the role of stimulus-response compatibility in generating 
action slips.  Directional alterations were also interested in the role of stimulus-response 
compatibility to a degree however, this type of manipulation differed in that the actual 
goal of the movement had to be changed in order to execute the sequence correctly.  In 
other words, an on-line adjustment, which requires active, sustained attention, had to be 
made to the expected action routine to avoid a slip.    
Effectiveness of the Slip Induction Task 
 One of the initial goals of this study was to replicate the results found by Parakh 
(2003).  In her Master’s thesis, Parakh reports that the altered trials used in our slip 
induction paradigm were successful in generating significantly more action slips than 
trials that were not altered.  This follow-up study found evidence which further supports 
this claim.  In fact, the results of this study suggests that while directional alterations 
were most detrimental to performance, combined and even positional alterations also 
resulted in significantly more slips than trials which were not altered in any way. 
 The ability of this experimental paradigm to actually induce action slips, 
especially in response to directional and combined alterations, is interesting as it shows 
that at least when the goal of the action was changed participants were unable to adjust 
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their actions in response to the unexpected changes in the routine.  Consequently, it 
appears that the supervisory attention system was not effective at interrupting the 
contention scheduling system at the critical decision points in the action routine.  For 
both directional and combined alterations, the goal of the movement had to change in 
order for the sequence to be executed correctly.  It is expected that the reduced accuracy 
associated with the directional alterations is, at least partially, the result of the fact that 
the arrow cue was spatially compatible with the expected, yet incorrect target button.  In 
addition, the fact that combined alterations also induced slips, though less frequently 
than directional alterations, suggests that something about the new physical location of 
the arrow cue reduced the participants’ likelihood of making an error.  One potential 
explanation for how this occurred is that completely violating the participants’ 
expectancies, by changing both the direction and location of the arrow cue, made the 
changes more salient and therefore more obvious to the supervisory attention system. 
 In Norman and Shallice’s model (2000) and even earlier, in Reason’s writings 
(1977, 1979, 1984) the role of critical decision points is stressed.  These points in the 
execution of any goal-related multi-step action are times when the performer is required 
to consider the overall goal of the action as well as the steps that have been completed 
to date to achieve that goal.  Should these considerations not be made at the critical 
times, errors in the routine are likely and they might take the form of repetitions, 
omissions or outright errors in the course of action.  It is probable that the slips of action 
that resulted from directional and combined alterations were, at least in part, the result 
of failing to check that the goal of the current action was the same as the goal of the 
action from the previous sequence.  Now, while it is impossible, with this data, to 
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ascertain whether the supervisory attention system failed to activate, or whether the 
supervisory attention system activated yet failed to interrupt the contention scheduling 
system, it is fairly safe to conclude that in one way or another, the participants’ 
sustained attention was not always adequate. 
 Turning now to a consideration of the rarer, but still relatively pervasive, action 
slips associated with positional alterations, it was expected that participants’ 
performance could be degraded even though the actual goal of the movement remained 
the same as what was expected.  Based on research on the Simon Effect (Simon & 
Berbaum, 1990) movements made to spatially congruent targets were faster and more 
accurate than to spatially incongruent targets.  Consequently, it was expected that by 
simply altering the spatial location of the arrow cue in this task, participants’ attention 
would be directed to the cue and they would be drawn to respond congruently yet 
incorrectly.   The results of this study indicate that while this type of error was made 
following only 13% of the positional alterations, this drop in accuracy is statistically 
significant.  As such, our data suggests that while slips of action are primarily generated 
by changes in the goal of an action, they can also be generated by unexpected stimuli, or 
in other words the distracters that are present in the environment.  This seems relatively 
intuitive since a number of action slips in daily life are reported to occur after a 
distraction (ringing phone in another room) or as a result of an inconveniently placed 
distracter object (sugar bowl located in the place where the cream normally is).  What 
might not be intuitive however is the fact that positional alterations, those with an 
obvious environmental distracter, resulted in far fewer errors than the other two types of 
alterations.  One potential explanation for this is that the type of environmental 
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distraction matters.  More specifically, for positional alterations the location of the 
arrow was different than what was expected, yet the location of the arrow did not 
coincide with the expected target.  For direction alterations, which were most 
detrimental to performance, a few factors were working against participants and this 
appears to explain why more errors were made.  With some thought, this explanation 
makes sense because it is quite simple to imagine a real-life predicament which would 
support this explanation.  For example, when preparing a cup of black coffee one can 
imagine being distracted by a phone call and inadvertently adding sugar to the cup, but 
the chances of this happening are less than if the phone was located in close proximity 
to the sugar bowl.   
The Micro-Structure of Sequence Timing. 
 The most significant addition that this paper makes to the study completed by 
Parakh (2003) is that each trial within each sequence was broken down into its 
individual behavioral measures.  As a result, we are able to consider not only STs but 
also the individual RTs, MTs and RtH times for each trial in the study.  This produced 
an abundance of data which has been categorized according to whether the trial was 
altered, came before an altered trial, followed an altered trial, or was not closely 
associated with an alteration.  Within this section those trials that were altered and trials 
that preceded and followed an alteration will be discussed.  
 Altered Trials.  For trials that were altered, RTs, MTs and RtH times were 
examined and some interesting observations were made.  Firstly, as was expected, 
participants appeared to either move in almost exactly the same fashion as when a trial 
was not altered, which eventually resulted in an error (no change in MT was observed 
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between trials that were not altered and trials where an error was made), or they made 
an on-line correction to their expected movement plan, which allowed for a correct trial.  
Evidence for this on-line correction is seen when examining the MTs for trials which 
were executed correctly, which are significantly longer than trials where an error was 
made.  Further support for this is found when considering the RTs and RtH times as 
these measures did not differ for correctly versus incorrectly executed altered trials.  
Consequently, it appears that for trials where participants were able to adjust their 
expected movement plan in response to a change in the sequence, the successful 
intervention of the supervisory attention system occurred during the period of time 
when they were moving from the home button to the target. 
Trials Preceding an Alteration.  Earlier in this document the hypothesis was 
made that movements preceding an error would be highly routinized.  Therefore, 
participants would come to expect movements in advance and would prepare for and 
program those movements in advance as well.  In doing this, participants would have 
almost entirely programmed an upcoming movement even before the actual arrow cue 
appeared.  This overlap creates a very small if not non-existent critical decision point 
which would be more rarely interfered with by the supervisory attention system.  This 
hypothesis was not fully supported by these data.  The lack of support may be the result 
of incomplete measures being in place to ensure that participants planned and 
programmed their movements during periods of time that we were actually recording.  
For example, in this study, no methods were in place to ensure that participants were 
unable to linger for a time on the target button.  If participants did press and hold this 
target button while preparing for the upcoming move, no increases in the RtH time or 
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subsequent RT would be necessary.  Consequently, while it remains possible that 
participants planned and programmed their movements in advance of the actual arrow 
cue, which would have allowed them to react and move more quickly for the upcoming 
move and increased their likelihood of committing an error, this is not substantiated by 
the results of this study. 
 Trials Following an Alteration.  Now considering the trials that immediately 
followed an alteration, our expectations were confirmed as participants’ increased 
reaction times and movement times suggest that they were eventually aware of their 
earlier error and their speed-accuracy trade-off and probably attempted to prevent 
subsequent mistakes by slowing down their progression through the sequence.  What 
remains unclear however is how long this effect continued.  Knowing how long the 
impact of making an error helped prevent subsequent mistakes has large practical 
implications outside the laboratory.  One would think that committing an error when 
making a cup of coffee would alert someone to their propensity to fail to attend to the 
goal of the action for the remainder of the task at least, but does this effect persist to the 
next day’s coffee making?   
Inducing Slips and Examining Them With Other Measures. 
 As was discussed earlier in this paper, one of the potential disadvantages of any 
experimental task is the fact that events as they occur in the laboratory are never perfect 
replications of behavior in real life situations.  Because of this, much of the research in 
the field of attention and action slips has remained within the domain of subjective 
reporting.  Studies of this kind are often extremely rich with descriptive information 
about the element of study however these descriptions are rarely trusted whole-
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heartedly.  In reaction to this, we attempted to devise an objective method of 
investigating action slips while also considering previously established methods of 
looking at attention failures.   
 Either at the beginning of the training session or at the end of the experimental 
session, all participants in this study completed both the SART task and the ARCES 
questionnaire.  Before making any claims about how these two tasks relate to the slip 
induction paradigm we first verified that the ARCES questionnaire was positively 
correlated with the number of errors on the SART to the degree that was previously 
reported in the literature.  Since these two measures were related to each other as would 
be predicted we proceeded to examine their correspondence with the slip induction 
paradigm.   
These analyses showed that SART misses, or trials where a response was made 
when it should have been withheld, were strongly correlated with the number of errors 
that participants made on our slip induction paradigm.  This was not surprising as both 
of these measures require an ability to withhold and adjust the expected movement plan.  
It is encouraging however to find that both paradigms were successful in generating 
slips and both appear to tap into one’s ability to inhibit a learned action routine. 
 In addition, the number of slips made on unaltered trials in the slip induction 
paradigm was found to significantly correlate with ARCES scores.  As such, 
participants who made more errors on trials that were not altered in any way were also 
more likely to report attentional failures, like losing the thread of a conversation, in 
daily life.  This relationship is extremely interesting as it suggests that participants who 
are more prone to errors in everyday routine tasks are also more prone to making errors 
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on our expected, routine slip induction experiment.  Considering the overall goal of the 
ARCES questionnaire in identifying persons who are less mindful and therefore more 
vulnerable to attention failures, the high correlation between unaltered errors on our 
task and the ARCES is very promising.  Now, with reference to our slip induction 
paradigm, the high correlation between these measures may suggest that participants 
who make more errors on unaltered trials are more likely to remember or feel 
comfortable admitting to making attentional errors in everyday life.  Another potential 
explanation however is that those who make more slips in everyday life are not being 
accurately identified when we consider only those who make many slips in response to 
alterations.   
Conclusions. 
Overall the results of this study on the ability to induce slips of action by 
manipulating a well learned action routine reveal that action slips can be experimentally 
induced.  In addition, it has also been shown that one’s propensity to make these 
laboratory based slips is highly related to one’s likelihood of making attentional and 
action errors on other experiemental tasks as well as in activities of daily living.   
Previous studies of this slip induction paradigm have focused on examining 
accuracy and overall sequence time in response to perturbations to a practiced action 
routine.  The most significant addition that this paper makes to this literature is that each 
trial within each sequence was broken down into its individual behavioral measures.  As 
a result, we were able to examine not only the time to complete an entire sequence, but 
also the individual RTs, MTs and RtH times for each trial in the study.  Without this 
more detailed information, it would have been impossible to test theories about what 
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participants were specifically doing before making an error, how they were able to 
make adjustments to their expected routine to allow for correctly executed trials and 
how they adopted more cautious strategies to prevent subsequent action slips.  
Considering the effectiveness of recording these timing measures and the 
experimental alterations to the routine action sequence, this study opens up a number of 
new research avenues.  Firstly, in the study reported here participants were instructed to 
also make movements according to the pointed direction of the arrow cue.  As such, 
even though one might have expected to move to the left target, if an arrow instructed a 
new move to the upper target the upper target needed to be pressed in order for the trial 
to be executed correctly.  These instructions resulted in an accuracy pattern where 
directional alterations were most detrimental to performance while combined and 
positional alteration also resulted in a fair number of action slips.   
A follow-up study will soon be conducted to investigate the accuracy pattern 
when different instructions are given.  In this future study, participants will be 
instructed to ignore the pointed direction of the arrow cue and instead to move to targets 
accordingly to the practiced sequence.  As such, even if an arrow instructs one to move 
to a new target, the expected movement goal must be attained to execute the sequence 
correctly.  For this follow-up study, it is reasonable to expect that very few action slips 
will be made by participants in response to alterations however, if any slips are made, it 
is sensible to expect that those errors will be in response to positional alterations.  By 
comparing the accuracy pattern described in this paper with that from the projected 
follow-up study it will be possible to develop a theory about slips of action and whether 
they are the result of top-down or bottom-up processing.  This is possible since in one 
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case participants are required to construct their movements one-by-one in response to 
the cues while in the other participants are to attempt to override the current cues and 
move solely in response to their learned action routine. 
In addition to this follow-up study, the slip induction task that was described in 
this paper can also be used to examine the occurrence of attentional failures in healthy 
older adults.  Typically, it is assumed that older adults experience more slips of action 
and attention in daily life however, this assumption may not be valid as older adults 
report an increased ability to focus their attention which should actually act as a 
protective factor against action slips.  Considering this, studying the slip induction task 
as well as the ARCES and SART with this population might help to elucidate a number 
of the assumptions that are held about action slips, the elderly and overall, a healthy 




Botvinick, M. & Bylsma, L. M. (2005). Distraction and action slips in an everyday task:  
 Evidence for a dynamic representation of task content. Psychonomic Bulletin  
 and Review, 12, 1011-1017. 
Broadbent, D.E., Cooper, P.F., FitzGerald, P., & Parkes, K.P.  (1982). The Cognitive  
 Failures Questionnaire (CFQ) and its correlates.  British Journal of Clinical  
 Psychology, 21, 1-16. 
Buxbaum, L.J., Schwartz, M.F., & Montgomery, M.W.  (1998). Ideational apraxia and  
naturalistic action.  Cognitive Neuropsychology, 15, 617-643. 
Cheyne, J. A., Carriere, J. & Smilek, D. (2006). Absent-mindedness: Lapses of 
conscious awareness and everyday cognitive failures. Consciousness and  
Cognition, 15, 578-592. 
Humphreys, G.W., Forde, E.M.E., & Francis, D.  (2000). The organization of sequential  
 actions.  In Monsell & Driver (Eds.), Control of Cognitive Processes: Attention  
 and Performance XVIII.  Massachusetts:  The MIT Press. 
James, W. (1890). The Principles of Psychology Vol. I.  New York: Henry Holt & Co. 
Manly, T., Lewis, G.H., Robertson, I.H., Watson, P.C., & Datta, A.K. (2002). Coffee  
 in the cornflakes: time-of-day as a modulator of executive response control.   
 Neuropsychologia, 40, 1-6. 
Manly, T., Robertson, I.H., Galloway, M. & Hawkins, K. (1999). The absent mind:   




Martin, M. & Jones, G. V. (1984). Cognitive failures in everyday life. In J. E. Harris &  
 P. E. Morris (Eds.), Everyday Memory, Actions and Absent-Mindedness.  
 London: Academic Press. 
Norman, D. A., & Shallice, T.  (2000).  Attention to action:  Willed and automatic 
control of behavior.  In Gazzaniga (Ed.), Cognitive Neuroscience: A Reader.   
Malden: Blackwell Publishers Inc. 
Parakh, R. (2003). Inducing slips of action through the unintentional activation of a  
 well-learned response. Unpublished master’s thesis. University of  
 Waterloo: Waterloo, ON. 
Reason, J. (1977). Skill and error in everyday life. In M. Howe (Ed.), Adult Learning.  
 London: Wiley. 
Reason, J. (1979). Actions not as planned: The price of automization. In G. Underwood  
 & R. Stevens (Eds.), Aspects of Consciousness. London: Academic Press. 
Reason, J.  (1984). Lapses of Attention in Everyday Life.  In R. Parasuraman & D.R.  
 Davies (Eds.)., Varieties of Attention. Orlando: Academic Press.    
Reason, J. & Mycielska, K. (1982). Absent-minded? The Psychology of Mental Lapses  
 and Everyday Error. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc.   
Robertson, I.H., Manly, T., Andrade, J., Baddeley, B.T., & Yiend, J. (1997). ‘Oops!’:  
Performance correlates of everyday attentional failures in traumatic brain 
injured and normal subjects.  Neuropsychologia, 35, 747-758. 
Robertson, I. H. (2003). The absent mind: Attention and error. The Psychologist, 16,  
 476-479.  
 
 51 
Schwartz, M. F. (1995).  Re-examining the role of executive functions in routine action  
production.  Annals of the New York Academy of Science, 769, 321-335. 
Shallice, T., & Burgess, P. (1993). Supervisory control of action and thought selection.   
 In Baddeley and Weiskrantz (Eds.), Attention: Selection, Awareness and  
 Control.  Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Simon, J. & Berbaum, K. (1990). Effect of conflicting cues on information processing:  
 The ‘Stroop Effect’ vs. The ‘Simon Effect’, Acta Psychologica, 73, 159-170. 
Tipper, S. T. & Baylis, G. C. (1987). Individual differences in selective attention: The  
 relation of priming and interference to cognitive failure. Personality and  
 Individual Differences, 8, 667-675. 
Weigand, K. & Wascher, E. (2005). Dynamic aspects of stimulus-response  
 correspondence: Evidence for two mechanisms involved in the Simon Effect,  





Figure 1: Pictorial Representation of apparatus (Parakh, 2003), button board and  





Positional Alteration Condition – note that the expected target (black with white dots) 











Directional Alteration Condition – note that the arrow cue is located in the expected 
physical location but that it does not point to the expected target (black with white dots) 
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Combined Alteration Condition – note both the correct target (black with white 
horizontal lines) and the physical location of the arrow cue are not as expected. 
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